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This report provides detail on the construction of an index of tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) for the 
50 US states for the time-frame 1969 to 2005. Separate annual indices are constructed for TELs on state 
and on local governments. The goal of constructing the indices is to provide a means to test a range of 
hypotheses concerning the impact of TELs on economic performance and on state and local government 
fiscal policies.  This report documents the construction of the index.  The data are provided in Excel 




In the name of forcing “fiscal discipline” on state and local government officials in 46 states have imposed 
some form of tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) (Mullins and Wallin 2004).  A commonly known TEL is 
California’s Proposition 13, passed by popular vote in 1978, which limits the property tax rate to 1 percent 
and limits increases in assessments to 2 percent or the rate of inflation, whichever is less, unless the 
property has been improved.   Another is Massachusetts’ Proposition 2½ passed by referendum in 1980.  
Local property taxes were capped at 2.5 percent of real property value, a tax break of $550 million--$347 
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million in property taxes and $200 million in car excise taxes.  Cities and towns above the limit were given 
three years to cut their rates.   Nominal annual growth in property tax revenues is limited to 2.5%, unless 
a vote of the residents allows a greater increase.  Others include Michigan’s Headlee amendment passed 
in 1978 and Colorado’s Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) passed in 1992 (Kornhauser 2002). 
Lowery and Sigelman (1981) identify eight potential reasons why tax revolts, particularly against the 
property tax, have been so popular in the U.S.  For practical purposes these eight can be classified into 
two broad areas. First, for reasons ranging from the lack of competitive market forces to self-interested 
bureaucratic behavior, government tends to be bloated and taxes are unnecessarily high.  Within the 
literature this is referred to as Leviathan-Niskanen-Buchanan hypothesis and the approach is often 
studied within the area of public choice theory.  Following this hypothesis, in the name of imposing fiscal 
discipline many states have amended their state constitutions or passed statutory limits on how fast 
taxation and/or expenditure levels can increase. In political circles this view would be most closely related 
to libertarian political ideals.  Second, taxes are a drain on the economy because government spending 
diverts that money from other uses and retards economic growth.  Based on this hypothesis, in the name 
of economic growth and development states have limited the level of taxation, and correspondingly 
government spending.  
One of the primary difficulties for a systematic study of the impact tax and expenditure limitations have on 
fiscal policies and/or economic performance is the unique nature of each state’s particular tax and 
expenditure limitation. Joyce and Mullins (1991) place tax and expenditure limitations into six broad 
classifications ranging from simple full disclosure–truth in taxation rules--to strict general revenue or 
expenditure increases (Table 1).  Full disclosure rules generally require some type of public discussions 
and a specific legislative vote prior to enactment of tax rate increases.  These types of tax and 
expenditure limitations generally are not fiscally binding (that is it is usually possible to work around the 
limit) and require a majority vote of the legislative body to increase taxes and spending. The most 
restrictive tax and expenditure limitations limit the amount or the percentage by which revenues and/or 
expenditures can increase from the previous year.  Often tied to inflation rates, population growth rates or 
growth in per capita income, these types of tax and expenditure limitations are the most binding for 
governments (Poulson 2005). 
Another complicating factor for research is the timeframe over which tax and expenditure limitations have 
been in place. West Virginia has had an overall local property tax rate limit in place since 1939 and 
Missouri placed its first focused property tax rate limit on local government in 1875 (Mullins and Wallin 
2004). Arkansas passed a supermajority requirement to raise taxes in 1934 (NCSL 2005).   Florida 
adopted limits on corporate income taxes in 1971 (NCSL 2005). California’s Proposition 13 was enacted 
in 1979, Colorado’s Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) in 1992, Massachusetts’s Proposition 2½ in 1980 
(Kornhauser 2002), and Wisconsin’s limit on the ability of local governments to raise property taxes in 
1993 (Deller and Stallmann 2007).   
 
This significant heterogeneity across the states in terms of how the TELs are structured and the 
timeframe in which they were enacted create a significant problem in modeling the dynamics of the 
interplay between the tax and expenditure limitation and subsequent fiscal policies and government 
performance as well as economic performance.  How this heterogeneity has been addressed within the 
empirical literature has been to study individual states in isolation almost within a case-study approach or 
the adoption of simplistic dummy variables in multivariate regression (for example, Cutler, et.al 1999; 
Mason 2005; McGuire and Rueben 2006; Deller and Stallmann 2007; Stallmann and Deller 




As noted above, 46 of the 50 states have some form of tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) in place on 
state or local governments with the oldest being a 1875 limit on the growth in property tax rates in 
Missouri (Mullins and Wallin 2004).  But as noted by Poterba and Rueben (1999) no two states are alike 
and TELs range from limits on how fast specific taxes can increase for specific units of government to 
strict limits on how much government spending can increase from one year to the next.  Using the work of 
Mullins and Wallin (2004) and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) (2005) we provide a 
summary of TELs aimed at state governments in Table 2, and a summary of TELs targeting local 
governments in Table 3.  
Modeled on the work of Poulson (2005), the intent of this study is to offer a TEL Index that quantifies the 
severity of the TEL of individual states on both state and on local governments.  By constructing such an 
index we are able to conduct more consistent cross state analysis ranging from broad questions on 
economic growth, development and performance and fiscal policy responses to TEL to more narrow 
questions such as the impact of TELs on the credit worthiness of state governments.   
 
We also hope that by compiling a national date-base characterizing several dimensions of state and local 
TELs and making that data-base available to researchers others can explore the creation of their own 
indices.  As in the creation of any index, our TEL indices include normative value judgments of how each 
characteristic of the TEL is entered into the index and the weighting assigned to each characteristic.  We 
provide the data on-line to make our judgments transparent and to facilitate construction of alternative 
indices by others. 
This report is composed of three parts beyond the introductory comments.  In the next sections we 
provide a discussion of how we constructed our TEL indices for both state and local governments.  We 
then provide a brief summary of our indices for a several states.  The report closes with a summary and a 
challenge to those interested in examining the impact of TELs to explore alternative ways to construct an 
index and expand the research into the impact of TELs.   
Construction of the State Index 
Based on a review of the literature (Joyce and Mullins 1991, Poulson 2005, Mullins and Wallin 2004, 
NCSL 2005, Skidmore 1999, Waisanen 2007) we describe tax and expenditure limits using six 
characteristics, each of which effects how strict or binding a TEL is: 1) the type of TEL; 2) if the TEL is 
statutory or constitutional; 3) growth restrictions; 4) method of TEL approval; 5) override provisions; and 
6) exemptions.  
Type of TEL:   In general, the types of TELs on state governments can be broken down into four major 
categories:  revenue and/or expenditure, appropriations, tax revenue, and general fund expenditure limits.  
General revenue and expenditure TELs limit how much revenue and expenditures can increase from year 
to year.  This type of TEL is the most binding on state governments.  Some states have either a revenue 
or an expenditure limit while others have both. Because governments with only expenditure limits can 
theoretically hold-over excess revenue from one year to the next, revenue limits are generally seen as 
more restrictive than expenditure limits.(Whether this is allowed is covered in the exemptions.)  In 
addition, TELs often only restrict certain types of government revenue and expenditure; appropriations, 
tax revenue, and/or general fund expenditures.  TELs that only limit specific types of revenue and 
expenditures are less restrictive than TELs that restrict all sources of government revenue and 
expenditures.  4 
 
Statutory or constitutional:  One important element of individual TELs that is not addressed in Joyce and 
Mullins’ classifications is whether the limits are statutory or constitutional amendments in nature.  As 
discussed in detail by Fino (2003) the distinction between statutory and constitutional limits is significant. 
Statutory limits can be more easily modified or rescinded than constitutional limits in times of fiscal or 
economic emergencies.  Fino does note, however, that unlike the US Constitution which is seldom 
modified, state constitutions are more easily modified, often to reflect short-term political winds.   Even 
though state constitutions are often modified, constitutional provisions tend to be difficult to remove no 
matter how dated the amendment or how forgotten the predicament that initiated the provision’s original 
adoption.  
Growth restriction:  Likewise, growth restrictions built into the structure of the TEL determine the 
maximum amount of allowable growth.  Several factors determine citizen demands and changes in 
demand for public services and the costs of providing public services:  population change, personal 
income changes (and income elasticity of demand), changing preferences and inflation.  Limitations that 
do not take all of these factors into account will be limiting.  The most limiting growth restriction ties 
allowable growth to changes in inflation and/or population growth.  Tying the growth rate of the TEL to 
inflation insures only that there are adequate resources to maintain the current provision of public goods 
and services but they may have to be spread across more people.  Similarly, tying the growth restriction 
to population growth insures only that the government is able to accommodate the additional demands for 
public goods and services associated with population growth, provided that inflation does not increase.  
The least restrictive type of growth restrictions are those that simply prevent new taxes from being levied, 
since this type of growth restriction does not prevent current taxes from increasing.   
Method of Approval:  Each state has its own rules and regulations as to how a TEL, whether statutory or 
constitutional, must be both introduced and approved.  The more difficult it is to introduce a TEL statute or 
constitutional amendment, the harder it is to change it in the future.  Unfortunately, nuances in individual 
state procedures make it very difficult to quantify and compare methods across states.  The most 
restrictive is a constitutional convention and the least restrictive is a legislative vote, which only requires a 
majority vote of the legislative body. The other two methods of approval—legislative referendum and 
citizen initiative are much more difficult to classify and are discussed below.   
Legislative referendums are measures that are referred to the ballot by at least a majority vote of the 
legislature.  Citizens must approve the measure with a fifty-percent majority in the next general election 
for the measure to become law.  Since the process of legislative referendums is relatively consistent 
between states, and requires a majority vote by both the legislative branch and the general population, it 
was ranked higher than citizen initiatives.  Citizen initiatives are measures that are placed on the ballot 
through citizen petition.  Only 24 states permit this type of method.  It depends state by state as to how 
difficult it is for citizens to propose new legislation through this method.  Some states, such as California, 
require signatures equal to a percentage of votes cast in the last gubernatorial election; other states, such 
as Nebraska, require signatures equal to a percentage of registered voters.  The latter is obviously much 
more restrictive than the former.  In addition to the variation among states in the percentage of signatures 
needed is the variation in the time allotted to collect the necessary signatures.   As a consequence, in 
some states, statutes or constitutional amendments that must be proposed and approved using this 
method may be more restrictive than legislative referendums.  In other states, it is the opposite. Ideally, 
the ranking scheme would reflect these differences, and allow citizen initiatives to out rank legislative 
referendum (and vise versa) on a state by state basis.  Unfortunately, without a deep understanding of 
individual state laws and procedures, it is not possible for the ranking scheme to take this into account.  In 
addition, policies and procedures constantly change.  As a result, it would necessary to not only consider 
the time frame of the TEL, but also the structure of the government at the time the TEL was passed. 5 
 
Overrides and Exemptions:  Override provisions and exemptions are mechanisms through which a TEL 
can be circumvented.  The strictest TELs do not permit overrides, or require voter approval in addition to 
a legislative vote in order to increase taxes.  The least restrictive TELs simply require the declaration of 
an emergency or a majority vote in the legislature.  TELs often exempt certain types of taxes and levies 
from the TEL.  This includes, but is not limited to the exclusion of debt service, court mandates or capital 
projects.  Each exemption weakens the TEL.  It is also important to distinguish between constitutional and 
statutory TELs.  TELs that are written into the state constitution are significantly more difficult to change 
or repeal and are thus more restrictive than statutory TELs.   
It is clear, that TELs are extremely heterogeneous.  As a consequence, a traditional dummy variable for 
the presence of a TEL in econometric analysis of tax expenditure limits does not sufficiently represent the 
heterogeneity of TELs.   In order to account for the differences between TELs in different states, we 
create a TEL index that assigns a numerical value to each state reflecting the strictness of the TELs.  Our 
method for constructing a state TEL index follows the work Poulson (2005).
3   The Poulson index, 
however, is static and does not take into account that TEL’s are dynamic; states regularly modify the 
constraints placed on tax revenue and government expenditures.  Therefore, the index constructed here 
provides a state TEL value that may change annually to reflect the tax and expenditure environment for 
each year from 1969 to 2005.   
In order to create the TEL index, states received point values in each of the six categories described 
above: 1) the type of TEL; 2) if the TEL is statutory or constitutional; 3) growth restrictions; 4) method of 
TEL approval; 5) override provisions; and 6) exemptions.   Data regarding specific TEL’s in each state 
were compiled from the Wausanen (2007), Skidmore (1999), Mullins and Wallin (2004) and Sokolow 
(2004).   High point values in each category correspond to stricter limitations, while lower point values 
correspond to more lenient limitations.  The rankings in each category are ordinal, and do not reflect 
magnitude.  For example, in our index, a revenue and expenditure limit is worth six possible points while 
a tax revenue limit is worth two points.  This does not mean that the former is three times more restrictive 
than the latter.  Rather, it simply indicates that a TEL that restricts both revenue and expenditures is more 
severe than a TEL that limits only tax revenue.  Each possible exemption to the TEL is assigned a point 
value of negative one as they each make the TEL less restrictive.   The sum of the points received in 
each category creates the TEL value for that state.  TEL values were calculated for each year during our 
study period.  Thus, it is possible to examine how the tax and expenditure environment in each state 
changes over time.  States without tax expenditure limits received a value of zero.  
The state TEL Index has a mean value of 5.2 with a standard deviation of 7.2 and a range from 0 to 30.  
The weighting scheme used in this index is:   
                                                            
3 Poulson uses five dimensions to evaluate and rate the 50 states on tax and expenditure limitations: 1) 
type of limit and method of approval, 2) what the tax and expenditure limitation limits, 3) the size of the tax 
and expenditure limitation limits, 4) treatment of surpluses, and 5) provisions for voter approval of tax and 
expenditure increases and waiver of the tax and expenditure limitation.  Within each of these dimensions 
states are ranked on a scale of one to five depending on the strictness of their law on that particular 
dimension.  For example, for the category “type of limit and method of approval,” states that have 
statutory tax and expenditure limitations  enacted through  legislative votes receive one point while states 
with tax and expenditure limitations that originated through citizen initiatives and are embodied in the 
constitution receive five points.  Using this scaling method, states with no tax and expenditure limitation in 
place receive a score of zero and the maximum score possible is 25.  See Appendix Tables 1 & 2 for a 








Tax Revenues (only) 2
General Fund Expenditure 1
Statutory/Constitutional Constitutional=1 1
Growth Restriction Less than or equal to inflation and/or population growth rate 7
Less than or equal to the rate of personal income growth 6
Limited to the rate of growth in the state economy 5
Less than seven percent of state income 4
Restricted to a percent greater than or equal to seven percent of  state income 3
Equal to a share of total revenue or expenditures 2
No new taxes or fees 1




Override Provisions No override allowed 4
Voter approval to raise taxes and expenditure of surplus wages 3
Supermajority vote  2
Declaration of emergency funds 1





Non-recurring general fund appropriations -1
State TEL Index
 
Construction of the Local Index  
Because of the unpopularity of the property tax, most local TELs focus on the property tax.  Typical local 
TELs limit the rate of growth in the property tax rate (mill rate), growth in property assessments or some 
combination of the two. The combination is often called a property tax levy limit where the rate of growth 
in total property tax revenues is limited.  Generally, increases are tied to the inflation rate or an arbitrary 
annual rate (e.g. 2 percent).  When the TEL applies just to property tax, local governments can often side-
step the limits by diversifying revenue streams through imposing user fees or charges or expanding the 
sales tax if one is in place.  The rapid acceleration in the use of these alternative sources of revenue in 
many states can be explained in part by the limitations imposed on property taxes (Mullins 2004).  
Because the property tax is predominately used by local governments and in particular public school 
districts, these types of TELs tend to disproportionately impact local governments. School districts in 
particular tend to have only property taxes and state revenues for funding. 
The TEL index for local governments was constructed in a similar fashion to the state TEL.  There are six 
main types of local tax limits: 1)the type of TEL, 2) specific restrictions 3)statutory or constitutional, 
4)scope—which local governments are included, 5)overrides and exemptions and 6)method of override 
(Mullins, 1995; Mullins, 2004;  Mullins and Wallin, 2004).   
Type of TEL: The most restrictive types of TELs are those that limit property tax rates or revenues. Less 
restrictive are those that limit assessments. Full disclosure limits are the least restrictive, as they are 7 
 
limited to making taxpayers aware of levy increase proposals and providing them with an opportunity to 
voice their opinions in public hearings.  Limits on assessments are relatively new, but extremely 
important, as they can make property tax limits more binding. 
Restrictions:  For each type of restriction the level of the restriction is coded. In addition, between the 
different levels of government and the different types of local TEL’s, there are many different 
combinations possible. The most restrictive TELs are those that limit the growth of revenues and 
expenditures to the rate of inflation or population growth.  The least restrictive are those that arbitrarily set 
a limit between five and ten percent.  Property tax rate limits generally place a restriction on the mill rate.  
The mill rate varies considerably, depending on the level government the TEL is targeting.  As a 
consequence, restrictions for the specific property tax rate limit were not included.   
Scope:  The scope of the TEL is the specific levels of government included.  The most restrictive apply to 
each level of local government; the county, municipality, and school levels.  The least restrictive only 
apply to only one.  As a consequence, in this index, the TEL receives one point for each level government 
that is included under the limit.  For instance, if a limit applies to all levels of government, it receives a 
score of four for this section.  If it only applies to school districts, it receives a score of one. 
Overrides and Exemptions: There are many different exemptions and override provisions in local TEL’s. 
Exemptions on expenditures allow the local government to increase overall expenditures despite the limit.  
Many local TELs exclude debt service, special levies, capital improvements and construction 
expenditures from the expenditure limit.  The sales tax option allows local governments to supplement 
property tax revenue using an alternative source that is not restricted.   Since it is not possible to 
determine the magnitude of the effect of each exemption on the strictness of the TEL, they have all been 
given a ranking of negative one.  
Override Method; Similarly, override provisions in TELs permit local governments to circumvent the limit 
by authorizing rate or levy increases. The method of override affects the restrictiveness of the TEL. The 
two most restrictive are those that do not allow overrides.  Most overrides are through popular referenda, 
which require a majority vote by the citizens.  In a few cases, the provision may require a supermajority, 
two-thirds vote, by citizens in order to increase the levy or rate. This type of override provision is the most 
restrictive.  In rare cases, the override provision allows an appeal to the state board or to the courts.  .   
The local TEL Index has a mean of about 12.5, standard deviation of 9.5 and a range of 0 to 38.0.  The 
weighting scheme used in this index is:   8 
 
Local TEL Index Points
Type of TEL Overall Property Tax Rate Limit 7
Limited to more than or equal to 2.5% 2
Limited to more than 2.5 percent 1
Specific Property Tax Rate Limit 6
Property Tax Revenue (Levy) Limit 5
Limit less than or equal to inflation or 5% whichever is less 3
Limit less than or equal to 5% 2
Limit more than 5% 1
Assessment Increase 4
No approved increases 4
Lower of 5%(0r less) or CPI 3
Limit less than or equal to 5% 2
Limit more than 5% 1
General Revenue Limit 3
No new tax or rate increase 4
Limit equal to inflation and or population growth 3
Limit is less than or equal to five percent 2
Limit is between five and ten percent 1
General Expenditure Limit 2
Limit equal to inflation and or population growth 4
Limit is equal to the change in per capita income 3
Limit is less than or equal to five percent 2
Limit is between five and ten percent 1















Methode of override No approved overrides 4
Super majority Referendum 2
Majority vote by local representatives 1
Simple Majority Referndum 1
Appeal to Courts 1
Appeal to state board 1  9 
 
Examples of the Indices 
Two separate TEL indices are constructed, one for state governments and one for local governments.  
The state TEL Index has a mean value of 5.2 with a standard deviation of 7.2 and a range from 0 to 30.  
The local TEL Index has a mean of about 12.5, standard deviation of 9.5 and a range of 0 to 38.0.  Our 
Index shows that states have tended to impose TELs on local governments to a much larger extent then 
they impose on themselves.  To better understand how our TEL Index is implement consider four specific 
states: Michigan, California, Massachusetts and Colorado. 
   
Michigan  Michigan’s Headlee amendment was passed in 1978.  The amendment is actually a 
package of changes to Article IX of the state constitution.  The major provisions include:  1) an overall 
limit on state revenue collections (a function of state revenues in 1978-79 and total personal income in 
1977), 2) a similar limit on spending, 3) a fixed share of the state budget for local governments, 4) a 
property tax rate rollback is required if growth in revenues on a community-wide basis exceeds the rate of 
inflation, and 5) the state must fund new local government mandates (Fino 2003).  This later provision 
has resulted in continuing litigation over funding of special education programs (Ballard, et al. 2004). 
 
Proposal A, passed in 1994, further 
limits property taxes by capping the 
increase in assessments on each 
individual parcel to the rate of inflation.  
This is similar to Proposition 13 in 
California.  Proposal A also requires a 
three-fourths vote of the legislature to 
increase the property tax levies used 
by local school districts. This provision 
moves control from the local to the 
state level.  While local taxes 
decreased, state taxes increased as a 
result of Proposal A.  The progression 




At the state level in Michigan, there 
are continuing accounting questions on how revenues are classified and which are subject to the state 
revenue limit. The Supreme Court has had to define almost every aspect of the amendment. Revenues 
that are less than 1 percent over the limit may be transferred to the rainy day fund.  If excess revenues 
are more than one percentage point over the limit they must be returned to payers of the state income tax 
or the single business tax (Fino 2003). 
 
California  Proposition 13 was passed by California voters in 1978.   Proposition 13 was preceded 
by several property tax limitations and school tax revenues had already been capped in 1972 (Stark and 
J. Zasloff 2003).  The proposition limits the property tax rate to 1 percent and limits increases in 
assessments to 2 percent or the rate of inflation, whichever is less, unless the property has been 
improved.  When property changes hands, the assessment may be brought up to market value. At the 
time of implementation, assessed values were rolled back two years.  Voter override is not allowed for 
operating purposes.  The measure also extends to some other local revenues and requires a two-thirds 
majority vote for new “special taxes” (Sokolow
 2000). 
 






1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005
State TEL Index Local TEL Index10 
 
In addition Proposition 13 gave the 
state government complete control 
over property tax rates and the 
authority to allocate local property tax 
revenues in order to equalize school 
funding. It thus eroded local control 
according to many observers. Local 
budgeting became a process little 
understood by either citizens or local 
officials.  Local governments began 
competing for the local sales tax 
base.  Local governments 
subsequently turned to greater 
reliance on local sales taxes and 
user fees (Douglas 2003).  In 1996 
voters passed proposition 218, which 
limits local governments’ use of 
service charges and assessments 
(Sokolow
 2000).  How these limits are measured over time for our TEL Index is presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
Massachusetts    Proposition 2½ was passed by referendum in Massachusetts in 1980.  Local 
property taxes were capped at 2.5 percent of real property value, a tax break of $550 million--$347 million 
in property taxes and $200 million in car excise taxes.  Cities and towns above the limit were given three 
years to cut their rates (Mullins 2004).   Nominal annual growth in property tax revenues is limited to 
2.5%, unless a vote of the residents allows a greater increase.  
 
Proposition 2½ has been amended several times.  In 1981 the legislature allowed property taxes on new 
construction to be added to the allowed annual 2.5 percent increase in assessments.   Originally a two-
thirds majority vote was required to increase the 2.5 percent limit.  This was reduced to a majority vote.  
To clarify, citizens may vote to allow the assessments to increase by more than 2.5 percent, but property 
taxes cannot exceed 2.5 percent of market value (Mullins 2004).  In 1986 a cap on state revenues was 
approved.  Growth in revenues was capped at the rate of growth in wages and salaries.  Excess 
revenues, up to five percent of state revenues, are directed to a rainy day fund and additional revenues 
are returned to taxpayers (Bradbury, 
Mayer and Case 2001). 
 
To make up for the anticipated (and 
actual) loss in revenues, many 
localities that had resisted assessing 
at full market value, reassessed.  
Municipalities also increased their 
reliance on fees.  At the same time, 
public school enrollments dropped, 
somewhat easing the constraints on 
schools.  While the state originally 
increased aid to local governments, 
when Massachusetts went into 
recession in the early 1990s, state aid 
was cut 30 percent in two years.  
During the recovery state aid rose, but 
fell again in the recession of 2002 
(Mullins 2004).   When investigating the impacts of Proposition 2½   Bradbury, Mayer and Case (2001 
p.289) found that “…house prices performed worse in communities that had slower increases in 
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spending, suggesting that Proposition 2 ½ led communities to spend ‘too little’ on services.”  The 
progression of the TEL in Massachusetts can be quantified and tracked as in Figure 3. 
 
 
Colorado  Colorado has a history of increasing restrictions on public budgets.  In 1977, growth in 
Colorado's general fund spending was limited to seven percent over the prior year's spending.   Excess 
revenue was allocated first to a reserve fund and then to property tax relief. This spending limit was 
amended in 1991 (the Arveschoug-Bird provision) to limit annual appropriations to the lesser of five 
percent of Colorado personal income or six percent over the prior year's general fund appropriations 
(McGuire and Rueben 2006).   
 
The Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) passed in 1992 imposed additional constraints: 1) any new tax or 
tax rate increase must be approved by voters; 2) revenue collections are tied to the collections of the 
previous year plus the growth in population and the inflation rate (local governments can include new 
construction); 3) spending is limited to a percentage growth (based on the Arveshoug-Bird provision 
above) and 4)  taxation options such as new tax structures like local income tax and state property tax, 
among others are also limited (Bell Policy Center 2003). 
 
Excess revenues of up to three percent of the general fund are allowed for reserves.  Their use, however, 
must be repaid in the following fiscal year.  This provision effectively means that the reserves are less of a 
rainy day fund and more of a cash-flow reserve (National Council of State Legislators 2006).  The rapid 
repayment provision makes the use of a reserve fund difficult during a recession because there is no 
assurance that recovery would be sufficient to repay the fund in the next fiscal year.  The mandated 
refund of surpluses went predominantly to the highest income taxpayers; the maximum refund allowed for 
low income individuals and families was $388 due to the structure of the earned income tax credit from 
federal income tax law.  Taxpayers 
reporting annual income less than 
$26,000 received an average refund 
of $256 while the average refund for 
those reporting annual income of 
more than $126,000 received $1,630 
(Bell Policy Center 2003).  
 
In 2000 voters passed Amendment 
23, which earmarked revenue equal to 
one-third of 1 percent of Colorado 
taxable income for a State Education 
Fund.  In general, the interaction 
between Amendment 23 and TABOR 
resulted in more required spending on 
education and less revenue for other 
categories of spending.  As a result of 
severe state budget constraints 
imposed by TABOR, in November, 2005, voters approved Referendum C.  Referendum C suspends the 
TABOR revenue limit for five years (excess revenues do not need to be returned to taxpayers) and 
changes the growth factor to apply to the prior year's limit on revenue growth rather than actual revenue 
collected in the prior year (McGuire and Rueben 2006).  Our quantitative representation of Colorado’s 





The primary objective has been the creation of an index of tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) strength.  
The heterogeneity of TELs has made systematic analysis of the impact of TELs on state and local 
government fiscal policies and level of services, economic performance and fiscal health of governments 
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almost impossible.  Most studies have either taken a case-study approach of examining a single state or 
have treated TELs in a naïve manner (e.g., simple dummy variables).  The construction of an index in the 
spirit of Poulson (2005) allows for a more systematic examination of the impact of TELs.  By building an 
annual index over a long time-frame we can also account for lags in how governments are able to 
respond to the imposition of change in a TEL. 
 
While we have tried to be objective in how we constructed our index in terms of the characteristics of the 
TEL to consider along with weighting scheme, there are numerous normative judgment calls.  For 
example, should a TEL placed in a state’s constitution have a weight of one, two, three or ten? By making 
the core data set that we have constructed available to researchers we hope that others can experiment 
with alternative weighting schemes.  We are convinced that if we are to fully understand the impacts of 
TELs we must be able to systematically look across all the 50 states.  The construction of indices, such 
as the ones reported in this study, we believe, move us one step closer to better understanding the 
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Table 1: Types and Classification of Tax and Expenditure Limits (TELs).
Overall Property Tax Rate Limitations: Limits on property tax 
rates are the most common form of TEL. These limits is on 
overall property tax rates and often sets a ceiling that the rate 
can not exceed without a vote of local citizens.  These limits can 
be circumvented through alterations in assessment practices.  If 
the rates limits are matched with limits on assessment increases, 
this TEL is potentially binding. 
General Revenue or Expenditure Increases:  This type of TEL 
limits the amount that revenues and/or expenditures can 
increase from the previous year.  Often tied to inflation rates or 
population growth rates, these types of TEL are the most binding 
for governments.  
Specific Property Tax Rate Limitations: Same for overall 
property tax rate limitations but targeted to specific units of 
government (e.g., school districts, counties) or narrowly defined 
service areas.  These can be circumvented through changes in 
assessment practices or in the case of specific services through 
interfund transfers.  As with overall property tax rate limits, if the 
limit is matched with limits on assessments, this TEL is 
potentially binding.
Limits on Assessment Increases:  Since the property tax 
collected is a function of assessed property values, coupled with 
the tax rate, this TEL limits the rate at which the assessed value 
of properties can be increased.  If there are no limits on the 
property tax rate governments dependent on the property tax can 
bypass this TEL by simply raising the property tax rate.  If this 
TEL is coupled with limits on the property tax rate, the overall 
effect can be binding on governments.
Property Tax Levy Limits: This TEL limits the amount of 
revenue that can be generated through the property tax 
independent of the property tax rate.  These limits often allow for 
a specific percent increase from one year to the next.  The fixed 
nature of this TEL makes it difficult to circumvent, accept for a 
diversification away from the property tax, for example, by 
increasing fees, charges and sales taxes.
Full Disclosure -- Truth in Taxation:  These types of TEL 
generally require some type of public discussions and specific 
legislative vote prior to enactment of tax rates or levy increases.  
These types of TEL generally are not binding and requires a 
simple vote of the local legislative body to increase taxes.
Source:  Joyce and Mullins (1991).  15 
 










Arizona 1992 I 3-Feb All taxes
Arkansas 1934 R 4-Mar
All taxes except 
sales and 
alcohol
California 1979 I 3-Feb All taxes
Colorado 1992 I 3-Feb All taxes 
1
Delaware 1980 R 5-Mar All taxes




Kentucky 2000 R 5-Mar All taxes 
3
Louisiana 1966 R 3-Feb All taxes
Michigan 1994 R 4-Mar
State property 
tax
Mississippi 1970 R 5-Mar All taxes
Missouri 1996 R 3-Feb All taxes 
4
Nevada 1996 I 3-Feb All taxes
Oklahoma 1992 I 4-Mar All taxes
Oregon 1996 R 5-Mar All taxes
South Dakota 1996 R 3-Feb All taxes
Washington 1993 I 3-Feb All taxes
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
 http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/tels2005.htm








Type of Limit Main Features of the Limit
Alaska 1982 Constitution Spending
A cap on appropriations grows yearly by the 
increase in population and inflation.
Arizona 1978 Constitution Spending
Appropriations cannot be more than 7.41% of total 
state personal income.
California 1979 Constitution Spending
Annual appropriations growth linked to population 
growth and per capita personal income growth.
Colorado 1991 Statute Spending
General fund appropriations limited to the lesser of 
a) 5% of total state personal income or b) 6% over 




Most revenues limited to population growth plus 
inflation. Changes to spending limits or tax 
increases must receive voter approval.
Connecticut 1991 Statute Spending
Spending limited to average of growth in personal 
income for previous five years or previous year's 
increase in inflation, whichever is greater.
1992 Constitution Spending
Voters approved a limit similar to the statutory one in 
1992, but it has not received the three-fifths vote in 





Appropriations limited to 98% of revenue estimate.
Florida 1994 Constitution Revenue
Revenue limited to the average growth rate in state 
personal income for previous five years.
Hawaii 1978 Constitution Spending
General fund spending must be less than the 
average growth in personal income in previous three 
years.
Idaho 1980 Statute Spending
General fund appropriations cannot exceed 5.33% of 
total state personal income, as estimated by the 
State Tax Commission. One-time expenditures are 
exempt.
Indiana 2002 Statute Spending
State spending cap per fiscal year with growth set 
according to formula for each biennial period.
Iowa 1992 Statute Appropriations
Appropriations limited to 99% of the adjusted 
revenue estimate.
Louisiana 1993 Constitution Spending
Expenditures limited to 1992 appropriations plus 
annual growth in state per capita personal income.
Maine 2005 Statute Spending
Expenditure growth limited to a 10-year average of 
personal income growth, or maximum of 2.75%. 
Formulas are based on state's tax burden ranking.
Massachusetts 1986 Statute Revenue
Revenue cannot exceed the three-year average 
growth in state wages and salaries. The limit was 
amended in 2002 adding definitions for a limit that 
would be tied to inflation in government purchasing 
plus 2 percent.
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
 http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/tels2005.htm








Type of Limit Main Features of the Limit
Michigan 1978 Constitution Revenue
Revenue limited to 1% over 9.49% of the previous 
year's state personal income.
Mississippi 1982 Statute Appropriations
Appropriations limited to 98% of projected revenue. 
The statutory limit can be amended by majority vote 
of legislature.
Missouri 1980 Constitution Revenue





Voter approval required for tax hikes over 
approximately $77 million or 1% of state revenues, 
whichever is less.
Montana 1981 Statute Spending
Spending is limited to a growth index based on state 
personal income.
Nevada 1979 Statute Spending
Proposed expenditures are limited to the biennial 
percentage growth in state population and inflation.
New Jersey 1990 Statute Spending
Expenditures are limited to the growth in state 
personal income.
North Carolina 1991 Statute Spending
Spending is limited to 7% or less of total state 
personal income.
Oklahoma 1985 Constitution Spending
Expenditures are limited to 12% annual growth 
adjusted for inflation.
1985 Constitution Appropriations
Appropriations are limited to 95% of certified 
revenue.
Oregon 2000 Constitution Revenue
Any general fund revenue in excess of 2% of the 
revenue estimate must be refunded to taxpayers.
2001 Statute Spending
Appropriations growth limited to 8% of projected 
personal income for biennium.
Rhode Island 1992 Constitution Appropriations Appropriations limited to 98% of projected revenue.
1980
1984
Tennessee 1978 Constitution Spending
Appropriations limited to the growth in state 
personal income.
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
 http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/tels2005.htm
South Carolina Constitution Spending
Spending growth is limited by either the average 
growth in personal income or 9.5% of total state 
personal income for the previous year, whichever is 
greater. The number of state employees is limited to 
a ratio of state population.








Type of Limit Main Features of the Limit
Texas 1978 Constitution Spending
Biennial appropriations limited to the growth in state 
personal income.
Utah 1989 Statute Spending
Spending growth is limited by formula that includes 
growth in population, and inflation.
Washington 1993 Statute Spending
Spending limited to average of inflation for previous 
three years plus population growth.
Wisconsin 2001 Statute Spending
Spending limit on qualified appropriations (some 
exclusions) limited to personal income growth rate.
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
 http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/tels2005.htm





Table 3: TEL Currently Imposed on Local Governments (Original Year of Imposition/Amendment)
Overall Property Tax Rate Limit Specific Property Tax Rate Limit Property Tax Revenue Limit Assessment Increase Limit General Revenue Limit General Expenditure Limit Full Disclosure
Alabama  1972/78 CMS 1875 CM 1916 S
Alaska 1972 M 1972 M
Arizona 1980 CMS 1913/80 CM 1980 CMS 1921/80 CM 1974/81 S
Arkansas 1883 CM 1981 CMS 2000 CMS
California 1978/86 CMS 1997 CMS 1978 CMS 1972 S 1979/90 CMS
Colorado 1992 CMS 1913 CM 1992 S 1992 CMS 1992 CMS 1983 CM 1992 S
Connecticut (none)
Delaware 1972 C 1976 C
Florida 1968 CM 1855/68/73 S 1995 CMS 1974/80 CMS
Georgia c.1890/82(r) C 1945 S 1991 CMS
Hawaii 1977 C
Idaho 1978 CMS 1913 C 1967 M 1963 S 1979/92(r) CMS 1991 CMS
Ilinois 1939 C 1961 MS 1991 CMS 1981 CMS
Indiana 1973/77/80 CMS
Iowa n.a./83 C 1972/92 M 1989 S 1978/80 CMS 1971 S 1983 C
Kansas 1933/89(s) CMS 1970/89(s) CM 1973 S
Kentucky 1908 C 1908/85 M 1946 S 1979 CMS 1979 CMS
Louisiana 1974 CMS 1978 CMS
Maine (none)
Maryland 1957/91 CMS 1977 CM
Massachusetts 1980/91 M 1980/83 M
Michigan 1933 CS 1949 M 1994 S 1978 CMS 1994 CMS 1982 CMS
Minnesota 1971/93(r) CM 1985 CMS
Mississippi 1980 CM 1983/09 S
Missouri 1875 CMS 1980 CMS
Source: Mullins and Wallin (2004)
C = County; M = Municipality; S = School District
(r) Repealed effect year specified
(s) Suspended effective year specified  21 
 
Table 3: TEL Currently Imposed on Local Governments (Original Year of Imposition/Amendment) (cont.)
Overall Property Tax Rate Limit Specific Property Tax Rate Limit Property Tax Revenue Limit Assessment Increase Limit General Revenue Limit General Expenditure Limit Full Disclosure
Montana 1931/87 C n.a./65 M 1971 S 1987 CM 1974 CMS
Nebraska 1903 C 1957 M 1921/99 S 1990 CM 1996 CM 1991/96 S 1990 CM
Nevada 1936 CMS 1929 MS 1983 C 1983/87 M 1984/89(r) CM 1985 CMS
New Hampshire (none)
New Jersey  1980 C 1976/91 M 1976/90 S
New Mexico 1914 CMS 1973/87 CMS 1979 CMS 1979/00 CMS
New York  1894 CMS 1981 C 1986 M
North Carolina 1973 CM
North Dakota 1929 CMS 1981 CM
Ohio 1929/34/53 CMS 1976 CMS
Oklahoma 1933 CMA 1996 CMS
Oregon 1991 CMS 1997 CM 1991/97 S
Pennsylvania 1959 CMS c.1940 C
Rhode Island 1985 M 1979 M
South Carolina 1975 CMS
South Dakota 1915 CMS
Tennessee 1979 CM
Texas 1876 CM 1888 S 1982 CMS 1982 CMS
Utah 1898/61 C 1929 M 1929/88 S 1969/86(r) CMS 1986 CMS
Vermont (none)
Virginia 1976 CM
Washington 1944/73 CMS 1973 CM 1971/79/01 CM 1979/01 S 2000 CMS 1990 CMS
West Virginia 1939 CMS 1939 CMS 1990 CMS
Wisconsin 1994 C 1994 S
Wyoming 1890 CM 1911 S
Source: Mullins and Wallin (2004)
C = County; M = Municipality; S = School District
(r) Repealed effect year specified
(s) Suspended effective year specified  22 
 
Table 4: TEL Index


























1 9 6 90 1 0000 1 4690005
1 9 7 00 1 0000 1 4690005
1 9 7 10 1 0000 1 4690005
1 9 7 20 1 5000 1 4690 1 205
1973 0 15 0 13 0 14 6 9 0 12 0 5
1974 0 15 0 13 0 15 6 9 0 12 0 5
1975 0 15 0 13 0 15 6 9 0 12 0 5
1976 0 15 0 13 0 15 6 9 0 12 0 5
1977 0 15 0 13 12 15 6 9 0 25 13 5
1978 0 15 0 13 12 15 6 9 8 25 13 5
1979 0 15 0 13 18 15 6 9 18 25 13 5
1980 0 15 0 13 18 32 6 9 18 25 13 5
1 9 8 1 01 5 01 31 83 2 61 81 82 51 3 5
1 9 8 2 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 51 3 5
1 9 8 3 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 51 3 6
1 9 8 4 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 51 3 6
1 9 8 5 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 71 3 6
1 9 8 6 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 71 3 6
1 9 8 7 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 71 3 6
1 9 8 8 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 71 3 6
1 9 8 9 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 71 3 6
1 9 9 0 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 71 3 6
1 9 9 1 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 71 4 6
1 9 9 2 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 73 03 8
1 9 9 3 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 73 03 8
1 9 9 4 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 73 03 8
1 9 9 5 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 73 03 8
1 9 9 6 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 82 73 03 8
1 9 9 7 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 83 63 03 8
1 9 9 8 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 83 63 03 8
1 9 9 9 01 51 51 31 83 2 61 81 83 63 03 8
2 0 0 0 01 51 51 31 83 2 62 11 83 63 03 8
2 0 0 1 01 51 51 31 83 2 62 11 83 63 03 8
2 0 0 2 01 51 51 31 83 2 62 11 83 63 03 8
2 0 0 3 01 51 51 31 83 2 62 11 83 63 03 8
2 0 0 4 01 51 51 31 83 2 62 11 83 63 03 8
2 0 0 5 01 51 51 31 83 2 62 11 83 6 03 8  23 
 
Table 4: TEL Index (cont.)


























1 9 6 9000009080005
1 9 7 0000009080005
1 9 7 1000009080005
1 9 7 2000809080005
1 9 7 3000809080005
1 9 7 400080 1 3080005
1 9 7 500080 1 3080005
1 9 7 600090 1 3080005
1 9 7 700090 1 3080205
1978 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 8 13 2 0 12
1979 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 8 13 2 0 24
1980 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 8 13 2 7 24
1981 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 8 13 2 7 24
1982 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 8 13 2 7 24
1983 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 7 13 2 7 24
1984 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 7 13 2 7 24
1985 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 7 13 2 7 24
1986 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 7 13 2 7 24
1987 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 7 13 2 7 24
1988 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 7 13 2 7 24
1989 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 7 13 2 7 24
1990 0 0 12 9 0 13 0 7 13 2 7 24
1 9 9 1 0 01 2 9 01 3 01 11 3 2 72 8
1992 12 0 12 9 0 13 0 11 13 2 7 16
1993 12 0 12 9 0 13 0 11 13 2 7 16
1 9 9 41 2 01 2 91 71 3 01 11 3 2 71 6
1 9 9 51 2 01 2 91 72 2 01 11 3 2 71 6
1 9 9 61 2 01 2 92 52 2 01 11 3 2 71 6
1 9 9 71 2 01 2 92 52 2 01 11 3 2 71 6
1 9 9 81 2 01 2 92 52 2 01 11 3 2 71 6
1 9 9 91 2 01 2 92 52 2 01 11 3 2 71 6
2 0 0 01 2 01 2 92 52 2 01 11 3 2 71 6
2 0 0 11 2 01 2 92 52 2 01 11 3 2 71 6
2 0 0 21 2 01 2 92 52 2 01 11 3 2 71 6
2 0 0 31 2 01 2 92 52 2 01 11 3 2 71 6
2 0 0 41 2 01 2 92 52 2 01 11 3 2 71 6
2 0 0 51 2 01 2 92 52 2 01 11 3 2 71 6  24 
 
Table 4: TEL Index (cont.)


























1 9 6 9060000090 1 100
1 9 7 00600050 1 70 1 100
1 9 7 10600080 1 70 1 100
1 9 7 20600090 1 70 1 100
1 9 7 3060 1 2090 1 50 1 100
1 9 7 4060 1 2090 1 50 1 109
1 9 7 5060 1 2090 1 50 1 109
1 9 7 6060 1 2090 1 50 1 109
1 9 7 7060 1 0090 1 50 1 109
1 9 7 8 0 6 01 0 01 6 01 5 01 1 01 9
1 9 7 9 0 6 01 0 01 6 01 5 02 5 81 9
1 9 8 006090 1 60 1 50 2 58 1 9
1 9 8 1 01 0 0 9 01 6 01 5 02 5 81 9
1 9 8 2 01 0 0 9 01 6 01 5 02 5 81 9
1 9 8 3 01 0 0 9 01 8 01 5 02 5 81 9
1 9 8 4 01 0 0 9 01 8 01 5 02 5 81 9
1 9 8 5 01 0 0 9 01 8 01 5 02 6 81 9
1 9 8 6 01 0 0 9 01 8 01 5 02 6 81 9
1 9 8 7 01 0 0 9 01 8 01 5 02 6 81 9
1 9 8 8 01 0 0 9 01 8 01 5 02 6 81 9
1 9 8 90 1 0090 1 9080 2 68 1 9
1 9 9 00 1 0090 1 9080 2 68 1 9
1 9 9 10 2 0090 1 9080 2 68 1 9
1 9 9 20 2 0094 1 9080 2 68 1 9
1 9 9 3 02 0 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 21 9
1 9 9 4 02 0 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 21 9
1 9 9 5 02 0 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 21 9
1 9 9 6 02 0 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 31 9
1 9 9 7 02 0 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 31 9
1 9 9 8 02 0 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 31 9
1 9 9 9 02 0 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 31 9
2 0 0 0 02 0 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 31 9
2 0 0 1 02 0 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 31 9
2 0 0 2 02 01 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 31 9
2 0 0 3 02 01 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 31 9
2 0 0 4 02 01 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 31 9
2 0 0 5 02 01 0 9 41 9 0 8 02 62 31 9  25 
 
Table 4: TEL Index (cont.)


























1 9 6 9 0007000 1 60000
1 9 7 0 0007000 1 60090
1 9 7 1 0007000 1 60890
1 9 7 2 0007000 1 60890
1 9 7 3 0007000 1 60890
1 9 7 4 0007000 1 60890
1 9 7 5 0007000 1 60890
1 9 7 6 0007000 1 60890
1977 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 16 0 8 9 0
1978 0 0 0 11 0 0 15 25 0 8 9 0
1979 0 0 9 11 0 0 15 25 0 8 9 0
1980 0 0 9 11 0 0 15 25 0 8 9 8
1981 0 0 9 11 0 14 15 25 0 8 9 8
1982 0 0 9 11 0 14 15 29 0 8 9 8
1983 0 0 9 11 0 14 15 29 0 8 9 8
1984 0 0 9 11 0 14 15 29 0 8 9 8
1985 0 0 9 11 0 14 15 29 0 13 9 8
1986 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 29 0 13 9 8
1987 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 29 0 13 9 8
1988 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 29 0 13 9 8
1989 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 29 0 13 9 8
1990 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 29 0 13 9 8
1991 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 29 0 13 9 8
1992 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 29 0 13 15 8
1993 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 29 0 8 15 8
1994 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 37 0 8 15 8
1995 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 37 0 8 15 7
1996 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 37 0 8 15 7
1997 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 37 0 8 15 7
1998 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 37 0 8 15 7
1999 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 37 0 8 15 7
2000 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 37 0 8 15 7
2001 0 0 9 11 9 14 15 37 0 8 15 7
2002 0 0 9 11 11 14 15 37 0 8 15 7
2003 0 0 9 11 11 14 15 37 0 8 15 7
2004 0 0 9 11 11 14 15 37 0 8 15 7
2005 10 0 9 11 11 14 15 37 0 8 15 7  26 
 
Table 4: TEL Index (cont.)


























1 9 6 9 0908090 2 00000
1 9 7 0 0908090 2 00000
1 9 7 1 0909090 2 00000
1 9 7 2 0909090 2 00000
1 9 7 3 0909090 2 00000
1974 0 9 0 13 0 9 0 20 0 0 0 0
1975 0 9 0 13 0 9 0 20 0 0 0 0
1976 0 9 0 13 0 9 0 20 0 0 9 6
1977 0 9 0 13 0 9 0 20 0 0 9 6
1978 0 9 0 13 0 9 0 20 0 0 9 6
1979 0 9 0 13 0 9 12 20 0 0 9 6
1980 18 20 0 13 0 9 12 20 0 0 9 9
1981 18 20 13 13 0 9 12 20 0 0 9 9
1982 18 20 13 13 0 9 12 20 0 0 9 9
1983 18 20 13 13 0 9 12 29 0 0 9 9
1984 18 20 13 13 0 9 12 34 0 0 0 9
1985 18 20 13 13 0 9 12 38 0 0 0 9
1986 18 20 13 13 0 9 12 38 0 0 0 9
1987 18 20 13 20 0 9 12 37 0 0 0 9
1988 18 20 13 20 0 9 12 37 0 0 0 9
1989 18 20 13 20 0 9 12 29 0 0 0 9
1990 18 20 13 20 0 20 12 29 0 0 5 11
1991 18 20 13 20 0 28 12 29 0 0 5 11
1992 18 20 13 20 0 28 12 29 0 0 5 11
1993 18 20 13 20 0 28 12 29 0 0 5 11
1994 18 20 13 20 0 28 12 29 0 0 5 11
1995 18 20 13 20 0 28 12 29 0 0 5 11
1996 22 20 13 20 0 30 20 29 0 0 5 11
1997 22 20 13 20 0 30 20 29 0 0 5 11
1998 22 20 19 20 0 30 20 29 0 0 5 11
1999 22 20 19 20 0 30 20 29 0 0 5 11
2000 22 20 19 20 0 30 20 29 0 0 5 11
2001 22 20 19 20 0 30 20 29 0 0 5 11
2002 22 20 19 20 0 30 20 29 0 0 5 11
2003 22 20 19 20 0 30 20 29 0 0 5 11
2004 22 20 19 20 0 30 20 29 0 0 5 11
2005 22 20 13 20 0 30 20 29 0 0 5 11  27 
 
Table 4: TEL Index (cont.)


























1969 0 10 0 15 0 0 0 7 0 11 0 11
1970 0 10 0 15 0 0 0 7 0 11 0 11
1971 0 10 0 15 0 0 0 7 0 11 0 11
1972 0 10 0 15 0 0 0 7 0 11 0 11
1973 0 18 0 15 0 7 0 7 0 11 0 11
1974 0 18 0 15 0 7 0 7 0 11 0 11
1975 0 18 0 15 0 7 0 7 0 11 0 11
1976 0 18 0 15 0 7 0 7 0 11 0 11
1977 0 18 0 15 0 7 0 7 0 21 0 11
1978 0 18 0 15 0 7 0 7 0 21 0 11
1979 0 34 0 15 0 7 0 7 0 21 0 11
1980 0 34 0 15 0 7 0 7 0 21 0 11
1981 0 34 0 16 0 7 0 15 0 21 0 11
1982 0 34 0 16 0 7 0 15 0 21 0 11
1983 0 34 0 16 0 7 0 16 0 21 0 11
1984 0 34 0 16 0 7 0 16 0 21 0 11
1985 0 34 0 16 0 7 0 16 0 21 12 11
1986 0 34 0 17 0 7 0 16 0 21 12 11
1987 0 34 0 17 0 7 0 16 0 21 12 11
1988 0 34 0 17 0 7 0 15 0 21 12 11
1989 0 34 0 17 0 7 0 15 0 21 12 11
1990 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 15 0 21 12 11
1991 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 12 11
1992 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 11
1993 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 11
1994 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 11
1995 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 11
1996 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 18
1997 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 18
1998 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 18
1999 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 18
2000 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 18
2001 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 18
2002 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 18
2003 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 18
2004 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 18
2005 0 34 0 17 12 7 0 16 0 21 18 18  28 
 
Table 4: TEL Index (cont.)


























1969 0 5 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0
1970 0 5 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0
1971 0 5 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0
1972 0 5 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0
1973 0 5 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0
1974 0 5 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0
1975 0 5 0 12 0 0 0 3 0 10 0 0
1976 0 5 0 12 0 0 0 3 0 10 0 0
1977 0 5 0 12 6 0 0 3 0 10 0 0
1978 0 5 0 12 6 0 0 3 11 10 14 0
1979 10 5 0 12 6 2 0 3 11 10 14 3
1980 10 5 0 12 6 2 16 3 11 10 14 3
1981 10 5 0 12 6 2 0 3 11 10 14 3
1982 10 5 0 12 6 2 0 3 11 10 14 3
1983 10 5 0 12 6 2 0 3 11 10 14 3
1984 10 5 0 12 6 2 0 3 11 10 14 3
1985 10 5 0 12 6 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1986 10 5 0 12 6 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1987 10 5 0 12 6 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1988 10 5 0 12 6 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1989 10 5 0 12 6 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1990 10 5 0 12 6 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1991 10 25 0 12 6 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1992 10 25 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1993 10 25 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1994 10 25 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1995 10 25 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1996 16 25 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1997 16 27 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1998 16 27 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
1999 16 27 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
2000 16 27 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
2001 16 27 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
2002 16 27 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
2003 16 27 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
2004 16 27 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3
2005 16 27 0 12 13 10 0 3 11 10 14 3  29 
 
Table 4: TEL Index (cont.)


























1969 0 8 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 18
1970 0 8 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 18
1971 0 8 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 18
1972 0 8 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 18
1973 0 8 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 18
1974 0 8 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 18
1975 0 8 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 18
1976 0 8 0 16 0 0 0 1 0 26 0 18
1977 0 8 0 16 0 0 0 1 0 26 0 18
1978 14 8 0 16 0 0 0 1 0 26 0 18
1979 14 8 0 16 0 0 0 1 0 27 0 18
1980 14 8 0 16 0 0 0 1 0 27 0 18
1981 14 8 0 16 0 0 0 1 0 27 0 18
1982 14 18 0 16 0 0 0 1 0 27 0 18
1983 14 18 0 16 0 0 0 1 0 27 0 18
1984 14 18 0 16 0 0 0 1 0 27 0 18
1985 14 18 0 16 0 0 0 1 0 27 0 18
1986 14 18 0 11 0 0 0 1 0 27 0 18
1987 14 18 0 11 0 0 0 1 0 27 0 18
1988 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 27 0 18
1989 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 27 0 18
1990 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 30 0 25
1991 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 30 0 25
1992 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 30 0 25
1993 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 30 0 25
1994 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 30 0 25
1995 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 30 0 25
1996 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 30 0 25
1997 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 30 0 25
1998 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 30 0 25
1999 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 30 0 25
2000 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 37 0 25
2001 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 37 0 25
2002 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 37 0 25
2003 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 37 0 25
2004 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 37 0 25
2005 14 18 18 11 0 0 0 1 18 37 0 25  30 
 











1 9 6 9 0007
1 9 7 0 0007
1 9 7 1 0007
1 9 7 2 0007
1 9 7 3 0007
1 9 7 4 0007
1 9 7 5 0007
1 9 7 6 0007
1 9 7 7 0007
1 9 7 8 0007
1 9 7 9 0007
1 9 8 0 0007
1 9 8 1 0007
1 9 8 2 0007
1 9 8 3 0007
1 9 8 4 0007
1 9 8 5 0007
1 9 8 6 0007
1 9 8 7 0007
1 9 8 8 0007
1 9 8 9 0007
1 9 9 0 0007
1 9 9 1 0007
1 9 9 2 0007
1 9 9 3 0007
1994 0 13 0 7
1995 0 13 0 7
1996 0 13 0 7
1997 0 13 0 7
1998 0 13 0 7
1999 0 13 0 7
2000 0 13 0 7
2001 0 13 0 7
2002 0 13 0 7
2003 0 13 0 7
2004 0 13 0 7
2005 0 13 0 731 
 
Appendix Table 1. Poulson Grading Scale for Tax and Expenditure Limits (TEL)
Type of Limit and Method of Approval
5 points TELs originating through citizen initiative and embodied in the constitution
4 points TELs originating through legislative referendum and embodied in the constitution
3 points Statutory TELs enacted through citizen initiative
2 points Statutory TELs enacted by legislative vote
1 point Statutory TELs enacted through non-binding legislative vote
What the TEL Limits
5 points TEL applies to all revenues or appropriations with few exceptions
4 points TEL applies to all revenues or appropriations with certain limited exceptions
3 points TEL applies to general fund revenues or appropriations
2 points TEL applies to general fund revenues or appropriations with limited exceptions
1 point TEL applies to tax revenues
The Size of the TEL Limits
5 points TEL limit equal to inflation and population growth
4 points TEL limit equal to the rate of growth of personal income
3 points TEL limit less than 7 percent of state income
2 points TEL limit greater than 7 percent of state income
1 point TEL limit equal to a share of total revenue or expenditures
Treatment of Surpluses
5 points Surplus revenue is allocated into emergency funds and budget stabilization funds
and then to tax cuts/rebates or debt reduction
4 points Surplus revenue is allocated to tax cuts/rebates or debt reduction
3 points Surplus is allocated to tax cuts/rebates or debt reduction and targeted expenditures
2 points Surplus is allocated to emergency and budget stabilization funds
1 point Surplus is returned to general fund or other expenditure accounts
The Provisions for Voter Approval of Tax and Expenditure Increases and Waiver of the TEL
5 points Voter approval required for increases in taxes, and for expenditure of surplus revenues
4 points Supermajority vote required in the legislature to raise all taxes
3 points Supermajority vote required in the legislature to raise some taxes
2 points Declaration of emergency and/or supermajority legislative vote required to expend
monies in the emergency and reserve funds
1 point Majority vote required for the legislature to expend monies in the emergency and reserve funds  
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Alabama 0 Montana 13
Alaska 15 Nebraska 0
Arizona 9 Nevada 13
Arkansas 7 New Hampshire 0
California 18 New Jersey 13
Colorado 24 New Mexico 0
Connecticut 15 New York 0
Delaware 11 North Carolina 12
Florida 21 North Dakota 0
Georgia 0 Ohio 0
Hawaii 18 Oklahoma 16
Idaho 9 Oregon 17
Illinois 0 Pennsylvania 0
Indiana 0 Rhode Island 10
Iowa 8 South Carolina 15
Kansas 0 South Dakota 8
Kentucky 8 Tennessee 11
Louisiana 20 Texas 10
Maine 0 Utah 10
Maryland 0 Vermont 0
Massachusetts 14 Virginia 0
Michigan 20 Washington 20
Minnesota 0 Wisconsin 0
Mississippi 9 Wyoming 0
Missouri 21  
 
 